It is significant that General Dallaire's famous cable warning to the UN DPKO of the coming genocide was entitled, "Request for Protection of Informant." General Dallaire's informant asked to be evacuated from Rwanda, possibly after temporary asylum in a foreign embassy.s UN DPKO rejected the General's plan . Thereafter, the informant, who was personally opposed to the extermination plan, understandably stopped informing UNAMIR about it. Physical protection of moderates is among the most important steps that can be taken to prevent genocide at this stage. The UN refused to do even that, although it was clearly within UNAMIR's mandate. General Dallaire's early warning of genocide was corroborated by the assassinations and further trial massacres of January to March 1994, which were also reported in cables to the U.S. State and Defense Departments.9 On January 21-22, UNAMIR seized a planeload of Belgian arms (shipped on a French plane) purchased by the Rwandan Armed Forces, which were then kept in joint UNAMIR/Rwandan government custody.1o At the request of DPKO, Dallaire provided confirmation of arms shipments and was finally authoriLed by the DPKO on February 3, 1994 to "assist the government of Rwanda" in recovering illegal arms. In mid-February, the Rwandan Minister of Defense requested landing authorization for three planes carrying arms, but General Dallaire refused. On February 27, General Dallaire repeated his request to DPKO for authorization to seize the caches of weapons the lnterahamwe militias had hidden all over Rwanda. (General Dallaire had sent a Senegalese UNAMIR soldier to see some of the arms caches with his own eyes.) U.N. authorities, including his direct superior, Canadian General Maurice Baril, again refused, referring privately to General Dallaire as a "cowboy" (inferring that he was reckless in suggesting such an action).
Belgium explicitly warned the U.N. Secretary General of impending genocide on February 25, 1994, but Belgium's plea for a stronger U.N. peacekeeping force was rebuffed by members of the U.N. Security Council, particularly the U.S. and the United Kingdom. 1 1 Having studied genocidal processes and the history of genocidal massacres in Rwanda, I recognized, during my first stay in Rwanda in 1988, when I did a study of judicial administration for the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, the danger of the ethnic ID cards that everyone in Rwanda was required to carry on their person at all times. I had dinner with Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), and we agreed that the designation of ethnicity had to be removed from the ID cards. I met with President Habyarimana several weeks later and urged him directly to issue new ID cards without the ethnic designation. "Someday they will be used for genocide," I told him. He remained impassive and non-committal. Others also urged abolition of the ethnic ID's, and that reform was included in the Arusha peace agreement signed in August 1993. New ID cards were even printed. But they were ·never issued. Hutu Power advocates wanted the ethnic designation retained . We now know why. During the genocide, ID cards became facilitators of killing, because they permitted the killers to quickly determine who was Tutsi. Those who refused to show their ID's at lnterahamwe roadblocks were presumed to be Tutsi unless they could quickly prove otherwise. Nearly all Tutsis were immediately murdered.
In Rwanda, the dehumanization of Tutsis had already been a feature of genocidal massacres in 1959, 1962, and 1972 . In December 1990, the Hutu Power hate newspaper, Kangura, published the "Ten Commandments of the Hutu." They included the injunction, "The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi." The Ten Commandments called for continuation of the Habyarimana government's policy that the army be exclusively Hutu, and that officers be prohibited from marrying Tutsi women . Cartoons and articles in Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they had invaded from Ethiopia . Tutsis were "devils" who ate the vital organs of Hutus. Twenty other extremist newspapers also published regular hate propagaoda against Tutsis.1 2 Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines amplified the hate propaganda from 1993 onward , and brought it to every corner of Rwanda using repeater antennae provided by Radio Rwanda, the government network.
David Rawson, the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, said RTLMC's euphemisms were subject to various interpretations and he defended its right to broadcast as "freedom of speech." 1 3 (This same misunderstanding of constitutional law was still prevalent in the State Department when I began work on Rwanda in July 1994. The public affairs officer responsible for U.S. policy on Rwanda explained that this was why the U.S. opposed jamming RTLMC. I explained , as a former law professor, that incitement to commit genocide is not "protected speech ." Indeed if there were ever a case that met the "clear and present danger" test of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, this was it.)
After the RPF invasion in October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees Rwandaises or FAR), the aii-Hutu government army, expanded almost overnight from 5,000 to 28,000 men .14 It got considerable assistance in training and arms from the French government. President Mitterand's son, Jean-Christophe, headed the Africa office at the Elysee Palace, and was a close friend of President Habyarimana. He was reputed to own a plantation in Rwanda and to be personally involved in the arms Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sold $5.9 million in ammunition, rifles, mortar bombs,. rockets, and rocket launchers to Rwanda on 28 October 1990.17 South African arms dealers were also a major source. Between 1990 and April 1994, Rwanda spent an estimated $112 million on arms, making it the third largest arms purchaser in Africa, only after oilrich Nigeria and Angola. 1 8The purchases were likely made with money diverted from loans by the World Bank. 19 It was the organization of extremist militias, however, that marked the organizational turn toward genocide. In 1992, the lnterahamwe, the militia of the ruling MRND party, was organized. It was soon followed by the lmpuzamugambi, the militia of the CRD, an extreme Hutu Power party organized by the Akazu elite to make the President's MRND seem moderate by comparison. These militias were secretly trained in camps run by Rwandan army officers, armed with machetes, Kalashnikovs, and grenades from arms shipments to the government.
By 1992, Rwandan moderates had formed several opposition parties and had won seats in the National Assembly. On 6 April 1992, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the quota system that restricted Tutsi access to higher education , she was attacked in her home by twenty armed men. 2o In November 1993, after she had been named Prime Minister in the government formed after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Radio Television Libre Des Milles Collines publicly called for her assassination. She was one of the first officials to be murdered during the genocide on April 7. (Her ten Belgian UNAMIR guards were also slaughtered.) Kangura and RTLMC called anyone who opposed Hutu Power an "accomplice" of the Tutsis and a secret ally of the R.P.F. Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (D. I.A.} recognized from radio intercepts as early as April 7 that centrally organized mass killing of Tutsis was underway, D.I.A. warnings went unheeded in the American government. Some U.S. diplomats in Kigali began calling the killings genocide on first day, and directly communicated their views to the U.S. State Department in Washington, DC. The U.S. Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, Joyce Leader, has told me personally that she began using the word genocide in her daily telephone calls to the State Department from the start. It was clear to her that the lnterahamwe and Presidential Guard were committing genocide. Although these reports were shared with top officials, including Assistant Secretaries and other policy makers, at their daily interagency secure teleconferences about the Rwandan catastrophe, other reports from the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda and the C.I.A. and he spoke Kirundi, the language of Burundi, which is closely related to Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda. The Ambassador's appraisal of the violence, however confused it was, therefore carried considerable credibility. After the entire U.S. mission left for Burundi on April10, with Ambassador Rawson in the last car, no further official channels existed to "confirm" reports from Kigali. The first defense against action to prevent the mass killing was denial of the facts. is, what are we going to do about it?" Ms. Joan Donoghue of the Legal Advisors Office gave her opinion that the word genocide should be avoided, because she questioned whetber the killings possessed the requ isite "intent" and because use of the G-word, "genocide" would obligate the U.S. to take action to stop it. Her oral opinion was soon followed by a written opinion from the Legal Advisor saying the same things.
Sadly, the lawyers were wrong on both points. Intent can be proven by direct statements, but it is more often inferred from actions, like the systematic pattern of killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. And unfortunately, the Genocide Convention imposes no legal requirement to take action to stop a genocide. It only requires passage of national legislation to outlaw genocide, 24 and prosecution or extradition of suspected perpetrators.2s The Convention's Article 8 states, "Contracting Parties may call upon the competent organs of the U.N." to take action to suppress a genocide. But that is not legally required . The U.S. continued to avoid the G-word until June. In a now infamous press conference on June 10, U.S. State Department press spokesperson Christine Shelley, reading from talking points prepared by the Legal Advisors, declared that "acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda." But when pressed by a reporter, she was unprepared to call it "genocide." This false distinction was finally buried the same day by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself a lawyer, who knew that Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts of genocide. An act of genocide ! §. genocide, just as an act of rape is rape, or an act of murder, murder. The U.S. Secretary of State finally called it genocide on June 10, after most of the killing was over.
State Department lawyers and policy makers did not want to use the G-word because they wanted to avoid a duty to act. So they chose another name for what was happening in Rwanda, one that would result in non-intervention: "civil war." Civil wars are two-sided (or multi-sided.). The lesson the Clinton Administration learned from Somalia was, "don't get involved in African civil wars." Policy makers, including U.S. Ambassador David Rawson in Kigali, saw the killing as a continuation of the civil war that had plagued Rwanda since 1990, a war the Arusha Accords were supposed to settle. What they missed was the turn ·toward genocide of the Hutu Power movement. Because they did not know much about genocide, they ignored the fact that most genocides have been committed during wars, including civil wars. Robert Melson has shown in Revolution and Genocide that it is precisely during wars that pariah groups are most likely to become identified as threats, and therefore objects of genocide. 2 7 Genocide and civil war are correlative, not mutually exclusive. The second defense against action was legal definitionalism -denial that mass murder fit the legal definition of genocide.
The press and human rights groups also failed to name the crime until two weeks into the genocide. French newspapers were an exception. The first newspaper that called it genocide was Liberation in an article by Jean-Philippe Ceppi on April 11, 1994 . Liberation had also been the first to use the word "genocide" in an early warning article about death squads in Rwanda in February 1993. But the left-wing Liberation is not given much weight by French foreign policy makers, and is not read, by anyone in Washington. Le Monde followed with a story by Jean Helene on April12. It, too, was ignored. Human rights groups held back until Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, wrote Colin Keating, President of the U.N. Security Council on April 19. The Pope waited to call it genocide until April 27 . 27 Melson, Robert, Revolution and Genocide, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 273. 
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What the U.N. Did and What It Might Have Done
The U.N. did not wait to intervene in Rwanda until the beginning of the genocide. Acting under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations had deployed 2,539 U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops to Rwanda by April 6, 1994.2 8 From the beginning of his mission, UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire argued that UNAMIR needed heavier weapons, and a minimum of 4,500 troops, all of them well-trained and well-supplied, with a clear mandate giving them authority to forcefully stop killing. That could have been written into U.N. Security Council Resolution 872 that created UNAMIR. But the U.S. and U.K. had opposed a robust mandate with the 4,500 troops recommended by General Dallaire because it would have been too expensive. 29 When the genocide began, policy makers in Washington, D.C. and at the U.N. believed that UNAMIR forces lacked the ~trength to arrest the spread of the conflagration, and they refused to consider sending in their own troops. In U.S. government parlance, such an option was a "non-starter." When that word is used, it really means, "We don't want to think about it." It is the product of what social scientists have called "group-think." Those who dissent are afraid to step forward to challenge the group assumptions. State Department policymakers who attended a crucial meeting in the International Organization Affairs bureau on UNAMIR's future have told me that after Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, National Security Council Peacekeeping Advisor Susan Rice, and International Organizations Deputy Assistant Secretary George Ward had all agreed that UNAMIR could not fulfill its mandate and should be withdrawn, they felt as subordinates that they could not object or contradict them, a classic case of "group-think." U.S. policy makers did not consider changing UNAMIR's mandate because they assumed that troop-contributors had only committed to a peacekeeping operation, not an operation to stop genocide. No one suggested asking the troop-contributors if they would stay. No one even suggested sending in U.S. troops. That was a "non-starter," not an option on the table. The U.N. Security Council's earlier failure, because of U.S. and U.K. reluctance, to send a strong UNAMIR force created the self-fulfilling prophecy that nothing effective could be done. In the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. took an active stance against keeping the UNAMIR troops in Rwanda. Ambassador Karl lnderfurth announced that position on April 15 in "lnformals," secret closed meetings of the Security Council, with the representative of the genocidal Rwandan regime present. Ambassador lnderfurth's announcement of U.S. policy had fatal consequences. The next day, the Rwandan Interim Government met, and knowing it could now act with impunity, decided to extend the genocide to Southern Rwanda. 3D
In the first week of the genocide, General Dallaire asked for a change in UNAMIR's mandate that would authorize him to take action to stop as much killing as possible. But instead, on April 21 , the Security Council, led by the U.S. and the U.K., ordered a reduction of UNAMIR to a token force of 270 troops.31 Over 500,000 Rwandan Tutsis were murdered while the U.N . "did a Pontius Pilate," as General Dallaire told State Department officials in Fall 1994.32
Would an UNAMIR Intervention Have Saved Lives?
How many lives could have been saved? We will never know. But General Dallaire, the commander on the ground who knew the situation best, was, and still is, convinced that a robust UNAMIR mandate, plus reinforcements, demonstrating the international political will to stop further genocide, could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.
The troops General Dallaire asked for were immediately available. Over 1 ,000 heavily armed French and Belgian troops fiew into Kigali by April 10 to evacuate their own nationals. If they had, instead, been used to reinforce UNAMIR, they might have had a powerful effect in deterring the spread of the genocide. An additional 500 Belgian reserves were available in Kenya, and 800 more French troops were stationed in central Africa. 33 Two hundred and fifty U.S. Special Operations troops stood by in Burundi to assist, if necessary, with the evacuation of U.S. citizens. There were also tens of French troops on June 23.36 Operation Turquoise saved more than 10,000 lives in western Rwanda, but also permitted the leaders of the genocide to escape into Zaire. 37
What finally stopped the genocide was the victory by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took Kigali on July 4 and declared a ceasefire on July 18. From July 14 to 16, a million refugees streamed into Zaire, the fastest migration of people in history. Refugee camps quickly fell under the control of the Hutu lnterahamwe. Remnants of lnterahamwe forces have committed mass rape and mass murder in Eastern Congo ever since. The war that ensued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has since cost over five million lives.3s
Why Did Early Warning Fail and Why Did the U.S. and the U.N. Fail to Act?
The major Western governments knew from the first days that mass killing was underway in Rwanda. The U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission used the word genocide in her calls to the State Department from the beginning. Much of the communication was done by secure phone calls, because both Joyce Leader and Ambassador Rawson were cut off from access to the U.S. Embassy for long periods. Classified documents confirm this very early recognition of mass killing. The information did reach the top levels of the U.S. government.
The real problem was genocide denial, first through denial of the facts, and then through denial that the mass murder was genocide. State Department and Defense Department lawyers who were opposed to intervention, either because of their own views or to please their anti-interventionist superiors, denied that the mass murders constituted genocide. That this denial was intentional can be seen from the fact that they continued to deny the genocide for two months, until long after it was obvious to nearly everyone else that one of the worst genocides of the twentieth century was underway. The problem is that early warnings of "mere" civil war and massive civilian killing seldom result in international intervention, whereas early warnings of genocide might. But in Rwanda, except for a few who used the sacred "G-word," none dared call it genocide--until it was too late. The Rwandan conflagration burned so fast that reacting after it started would, for most of its victims, have been too late. Within three weeks, at least 300,000 lives had been consumed.
Conclusions
The Rwandan genocide could have been prevented
The early warning signs were clear. UNAMIR troops were already on the ground in Rwanda, though with inadequate training and material support. But in a failure of political will , the U.S., the U.K., the U.N. Secretariat and the U.N. Security Council refused to act to prevent or stop the genocide. At least 500,000 and probably 800,000 people perished.
Two questions remain:
( 
The early warnings were ignored
In Rwanda, the U.N. DPKO and the U.S., as well as other governments, refused to discern the signs of genocide. Because they did not understand the genocidal process, they missed the early warning signs. There was, at the time, no systematic understanding among policy makers of how genocide develops so that the warning signs could be noticed. That is why, in 1996, I wrote a short policy paper for U.S. diplomats (now available on the Genocide Watch website) entitled "The Eight Stages of Genocide." 40 That is, it was written in order to provide an explanatory model of the genocidal process, along with specific policy recommendations for what can be done to prevent and stop the process at each stage.
After the genocide started, policy makers resisted and misconstrued the facts
Misplaced hopes for the Arusha Accords led the U.S. Ambassador and diplomats to ignore the planning for genocide within the Rwandan government and the Hutu Power militias. · In the post-Somalia era, policy makers did not want to get involved in another African "quagmire," so they minimized the facts. The first cables from the U.S. Ambassador treated the killings as a bilateral continuation of the Rwandan civil war, rather than as a one-sided genocide. The number of deaths in the early weeks was grossly underestimated . Closure of embassies and withdrawal of personnel and press prevented adequate reporting on the genocide, especially "confirmed" reporting in official cables from embassy staff. Generally, policy makers require "confirmed" fact-finding before they will take action .
Lawyers who did not understand the law refused to call it genocide
Lawyers at the U.S. State and Defense departments and at the British Foreign Office had little training in the law of genocide. What knowledge they did have, they misapplied. They created conceptual uncertainty among policy makers who relied upon them for advice. Their power to block policy determinations, press guidance, and · instruction cables saying that genocide was underway in Rwanda meant that for over two months the U.S. and U.K. refused to call the Rwandan genocide by its proper legal name. It also meant that the U.S. and U.K. refused to permit the U.N. Security Council to declare that genocide was being committed in Rwanda. Words, especially legal words, have consequences. During the Rwandan genocide, refusal to name it genocide meant that policy makers in denial could continue to obstruct action because they could argue there was no imperative to intervene. The lawyers even misconstrued the law on the duty to intervene, arguing that the Genocide Convention creates a legal, rather than simply a moral duty to do so.
Group-think ruled out effective options for intervention
When policy makers finally recognized the facts, they thought they had no acceptable options to prevent the genocide. , In the interagency policy meetings in the U.S. government, dispatch of U.S. troops was ruled out as a "non-starter," and was never seriously considered. UNAMIR was perceived as too weak and undersupplied to stop the rapidly spreading killing. U.S. or British airlift for UNAMIR re-supply and reinforcement was also ruled out because of danger to American and British personnel and because of fear that such a step would lead the U.S. and U.K. into another African "quagmire."
Policy makers had not considered options available when the genocide started. They believed that UNAMIR's Chapter 6 mandate would have to be changed to Chapter 7 to permit intervention without the permission of the Rwandan interim government. General Dallaire has always rejected this contention because he asserts that UNAMIR's Chapter 6 rules of engagement already authorized the use of force to protect civilian lives. They also ruled out asking UNAMIR troop contributors whether they would keep their troops in Rwanda under a changed mandate. Unfortunately, the U.S. and U.K. did not consider it feasible to change UNAMIR's mandate, though there was little chance of a veto by any of the other Permanent Five members of the Security Council.
Those who engaged in group-think policy making also believed their responsibility would never be known . This paper is one small crack in the wall of bureaucratic irresponsibility. Books by Linda Melvern, Alison des Forges, Samantha Power, Michael Barnett, and Jared Cohen have done much more. Eventually, policy-makers need to know they will be held responsible for their decisions.
The U.S. was unwilling to financially or militarily support a reinforced UNAMIR
Despite a Ghanaian offer to keep its troops in Rwanda, along with offers from several other African states to reinforce UNAMIR, the U.S. was unwilling to make the financial commitment to support an expanded operation. The U.S. and other military powers were unwilling to risk the lives of any of their own citizens. Instead they sacrificed the lives of 500,000 to 800,000 defenseless Rwandans. This U.S. position led the everrealistic U.K. to conclude that because U.S. approval in the Security Council would be necessary for sueh an intervention force, there was no possibility it would be approved; and hence, an endangered, undersupplied UNAMIR force should be withdrawn.
Rwandan lives were not worth saving
Although the U.S. and U.K. were willing to commit billions to save lives in Bosnia, where people are white, and the war was close to the interests of the European community, they were unwilling to do so in Rwanda, where people are black, and neither country has strategic or economic interests. This racist double-standard was pointed out repeatedly by Nigeria's Ambassador Gambari in the U.N. Security Council. Our circle of moral concern excluded people of a different race in a continent far away. We ignored our common humanity.
Ultimately the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide was a political failure. Those with power failed to protect the powerless. The world still lacks the international institutions and the political will to stop genocide. To address this fundamental problem, as I suggested at a conference on genocide held in London in October 2000, a global movement is needed in the twenty-first century like the anti-slavery movement of the nineteenth century. 41 To launch that movement is the purpose of Genocide Watch, The International Campaign to End Genocide, and the Interfaith Anti-Genocide Alliance.42
